Introduction
This Online Appendix provides additional information and results not reported in the main text of the article "Deliberate disengagement: How education can decrease political participation in electoral authoritarian regimes." In the second section we provide detailed variable definitions and summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis. In the third section we provide additional information on our balance checks. In the fourth section we present the results of additional robustness checks noted in the main paper. The fifth section provides a graphical representation of the testable implications results, while the final section presents results from analysis of education's effect on participation in a range of other African countries surveyed by Afrobarometer.
Variable definitions
The following variables come from the 1999-2013 Afrobarometer rounds. These definitions cover all the variables used in our analysis. 3 Balance checks Table 3 formally presents the balance tests shown graphically in the main paper. Figure 2 shows graphically no substantive difference in height across cohorts around the reform using data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). As noted in the main text, Table 4 demonstrates that missing observations are uncorrelated with access to secondary schooling. The results indicate that our findings are highly robust to the choice of "bandwidth". The point estimates are consistently negative across all bandwidths and variables. Only when the sample size becomes very small, for the small bandwidths, do our estimates become statistically insignificant. Table 5 shows the reduced form estimates from specifications including age fixed effects. Although the standard errors unsurprisingly increase substantially, given we remove considerable cross-cohort variation, the point estimates are similar if not larger than those reported in our main analysis. The inclusion of age fixed effects weakens the first stage, and thus cannot produce meaningful IV estimates.
Robustness checks
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.6 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 Year of birth Only national identity .6 .65 .7 .75 .8 .85 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 Year of birth Some national identity 6 Education and Turnout in Sub-Saharan Africa Table 9 provides tentative evidence that our findings generalize to other Sub-Saharan African countries. In particular, we focus on anocracies, as defined by the Polity Project: closed anocracies are defined as countries with negative Polity V scores, while open anocracies are countries with Polity V scores between 1 and 5. We document a negative and significant correlation between schooling and respondent turn out in closed anocracies, but no correlation-almost precisely zero-in open Notes: All specifications are estimated using OLS, include country and year fixed effects, and cluster standard errors by country. The samples in columns 1 and 3 are those of closed anocracies, and in columns 2 and 4 are open anocracies. Closed anocracies are those countries who have a Polity V score lower or equal than zero. In rounds 1 to 4 of the Afrobarometer, these are Burkina Faso (2008), Tanzania (2001 Tanzania ( , 2003 Tanzania ( , 2005 Tanzania ( , 2008 , Uganda (2000 Uganda ( , 2002 Uganda ( , 2005 Uganda ( , 2008 and Zimbabwe (1999 Zimbabwe ( , 2004 Zimbabwe ( , 2005 . Open anocracies are those countries that have a Polity V score between 1 and 5. In rounds 1 to 4 of the Afromarometer, these are Ghana (1999), Lesotho (2000), Malawi (2003), Mozambique (2002 Mozambique ( , 2005 Mozambique ( , 2008 , Nigeria (1999 Nigeria ( , 2003 Nigeria ( , 2005 Nigeria ( , 2008 , Zambia (1999 Zambia ( , 2003 Zambia ( , 2005 , and Zimbabwe (2009). Schooling is a scale of school completion that spans from 1 to 6: no or informal education (1), some primary schooling (2), primary school completed (3), some secondary schooling (4), secondary school completed (5), and some university education and above (6). Secondary is an indicator for whether an individual completed secondary school. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
anocracies. This findings closely mirror those in Zimbabwe, where education's effect on turnout was negative until the democratic opening in 2008. However, unlike our results for Zimbabwe, we should treat causal interpretations of the cross-country results with caution because the simple correlation between education and voter turnout could be confounded by other variables.
